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COMMENT
A COMPARISON BETWEEN SPECTRUM AUCTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND
I. INTRODUCTION
After 50 years of communications law requiring the Federal Com-
munications Commission to give away licenses for free, Congress in
1993 abruptly mandated the use of auctions for certain services. This
change in policy was seen as the best way to get new telecommunica-
tions services to the public quickly, and also as a way to raise revenues.
Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Com-
mission) looked to New Zealand, the only other country to have tried
such auctions, for inspiration and guidance. But New Zealand offered
an imperfect paradigm, as the auctions there seem not to have
stemmed from the same motives as the U.S., but rather from the push
to privatize what until recently had been a government monopoly of the
airwaves. The U.S. seemed to learn from New Zealand's mistakes in
auction procedure, but may have a still greater lesson to learn: that
there may be no need for a regulatory agency such as the FCC at all.
Unfortunately, both countries have been sidetracked from their pushes
to allow market-driven control of the spectrum. Both countries must
contend with the rights of minorities, which in New Zealand are guar-
anteed by treaty with the Maori, and in the U.S. by affirmative action.
This paper will compare and contrast the goals behind each country's
decision to auction and then examine the respective results.
II. THE UNITED STATES' DECISION TO AUCTION THE AIRWAVES
A. History of the U.S. Licensing Process
The FCC has three basic functions: to divide the radiofrequency
spectrum into bands (or blocks) allocated to specific services, to set up
technical parameters for the use of those bands, and to award licenses
to operators to provide services in those bands. The last function -
awarding licenses - has often proved difficult for the FCC. For most of
its 60-year history, the FCC used comparative hearings, a painstaking
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and time-consuming process by which each and every contender for
any type of license was given its day in court before an administrative
law judge, and only after this lengthy procedure was a license awarded.
The Communications Act directs the FCC to consider the demands of
"public interest, convenience and necessity" when granting or denying
licenses to use the frequency spectrum.' Early on, the Supreme Court
said that the FCC must accord bona fide competing applications a full
hearing by comparative hearings.2 As the number of technologies and
applicants grew, this process became quite time-consuming. As a way
to hasten the awarding of licenses, Congress in the early 1980s allowed
the Commission to use lotteries to award licenses for certain services
(most notably cellular radio).' Another licensing scheme was tried for a
satellite service whose allocated spectrum could only support one pro-
vider: the FCC forced all interested parties to form a single entity, and
awarded the sole license to that entity.4 Congress and the Commission
continued to be interested in improving the license-awarding process.
B. Why the Current Licensing Procedures Weren't Working
Comparative hearings and even lotteries take a long time to con-
duct, and this means a delay in delivery of service to the public. Fur-
thermore, because these methods do not award the license to the party
willing to pay the most, the recipient often resells the license to that
most-willing party. The government gets none of the profits from that
sale, and the public must wait even longer before the service is up and
running.5
1. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1995).
2. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1995), amended by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1981.
4. In re Amendment of Parts 2, 22 and 25 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate
Spectrum for and to Establish Other Rules and Policies Pertaining to the Use of Radio
Frequencies in a Land Mobile Satellite Serv. for the Provision of Various Common
Carrier Servs., Second Report and Order, 2 FCCR 485 (1987) (establishing procedure
for forming a consortium of all interested and qualified applicants); In re Amendment
of Parts 2, 22 and 25 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum for and to
Establish Other Rules and Policies Pertaining to the Use of Radio Frequencies in a
Land Mobile Satellite Serv. for the Provision of Various Common Carrier Servs.,
Memorandum, Opinion, Order and Authorization, FCCR 6041 (1989) (awarding the
sole license to the American Mobile Satellite Consortium).
5. For example, the lotteries to award cellular radio licenses were rife with stories
of abuse. One investor group that won a license to provide service in Wisconsin sold the
rights three months later to a major player in the cellular industry (McCaw Cellular)
for about $ 62.3 million. Jonathan Marshall, Stakes High in Spectrum Auction; Gov-
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In 1991, the National Telecommunications and Information
Agency (NTIA) issued a report calling for a complete revamping of
the government's approach to licensing. 6 The report concluded that not
only would auctions be a fairer and more rational way of assigning
licenses (as opposed to an arbitrary system like a lottery), they would
also be a good way to recover the worth of the licenses for the Ameri-
can taxpayer.7 The NTIA had read and evaluated a report commis-
sioned by New Zealand (see THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE below),
and was influenced by that report to push for the same reforms here.8
C. The Decision to Auction
The idea of selling the rights to use the spectrum came up almost
as soon as the government began giving them away. In 1959, the
Nobel-prize winning economist, Ronald Coase, wrote the seminal arti-
cle describing the inherent value of market-based auctions of the spec-
trum.' During the Reagan and Bush administrations, the idea of auc-
tions began to surface again, culminating in the NTIA study in 1991.
When the Congressional Budget Office submitted a study to Congress
in 1992 that projected revenues of from one to five billion dollars from
such auctions, it was fairly easy for the Clinton administration to get
auctions approved in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(the Budget Act).10
In the Budget Act, Congress gave the FCC express authority to
employ competitive bidding procedures (auctions) when awarding li-
censes to mutually exclusive applications for supplying commercial ser-
vices.11 Congress also charged the FCC with protecting the public in-
terest, and more importantly,
promoting economic opportunity and competition and ensuring
ernment Ends Giveaway of Broadcast Frequencies, S.F. CHRON., April 11, 1994, at
Bi.
6. NATIONAL TELECOMM. AND INFO. AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S.
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE, (1991) (hereinafter
NTIA STUDY).
7. Id. at 115.
8. Id. at 93
9. Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. &
ECON. 1 (1959). Coase won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1991.
10. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Auction Licenses to Use the Radio Spec-
trum, in REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS at 213-14, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(1) (1995).
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that new and innovative technologies are readily accessible to
the American people by avoiding excessive concentration of li-
censes and by disseminating licenses among a wide variety of
applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone compa-
nies, and businesses owned by members of minority groups and
women.
12
Of course, another major goal of the Budget Act was to raise revenues
for the government from the auctions.13
1. Major Concerns
The FCC was burdened by numerous fears and concerns sur-
rounding its task of implementing auctions. Aside from the concern
about obvious abuses (such as fraud and cheating), there were concerns
about unjust enrichment, prompt delivery of service, warehousing of
spectrum, and collusion.' The Budget Act cautioned the FCC to for-
mulate the auctions so that speculation, or trafficking, in licenses and
unjust enrichment could not happen;"5 the Commission itself wished to
prohibit collusion among bidders. 6
"Unjust enrichment" occurs if a bidder wins a license with a bid
that falls short of the true fair market value,' 7 because the licensee
could then resell the license at market value and make a profit. Not
only would the government not realize the fair market value of the li-
cense, but there would be a delay in offering the service to the public
while this trafficking went on. 18 "Warehousing" happens when a licen-
12. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B) (1995). However, the inclusion of women and mi-
norities in this section has come under fire in the wake of the 1995 Supreme Court
decision requiring strict scrutiny of any government classification based explicitly on
race. (Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S.Ct 2097, 2117. For a deeper discussion of
how Adarand has affected the auctions, see Legal Ramifications, infra.
13. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 6002, amending 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(j)(3)(C) (1993).
14. In re Implementation of § 309 0 ) of the Communications Act, Competitive
Bidding, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 8 FCCR 7635, 1 10 (1993) (hereinafter
NPRM).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(E) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
16. NPRM supra note 14, 93.
17. H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1993) reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833.
18. On the other hand, competitive bidding strategies could also cause applicants
to pay more per license than the real market value. This would be bad because the
winning licensee might not be able to make the system profitable, and the public would
suffer from either slow start-up or failure of the company entirely. The amended Coin-
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see does not actually build a system or provide service, but holds on to
the license so that no one else can use it. This "warehousing" would
keep the spectrum out of the market, forcing prices up on other pieces
of the spectrum. 19
Another concern was that frivolous or unqualified bidders would
skew the market value by bidding and then defaulting.20 A frivolous
bidder might only be bidding to drive the price up and beat down com-
petition, with no intention of actually winning or building the system. 1
(See THE AFTERMATH discussion below regarding the results and reper-
cussions of the auctions.) Therefore, the FCC required a licensee to
show its financial qualifications, which helped the FCC screen out bid-
ders that obviously did not have the funds to compete in the bidding.22
Penalties were also put in place for performance failures, to ensure
prompt delivery of service to rural areas, to prevent stockpiling or
warehousing of spectrum, and to promote investment in and rapid de-
ployment of new technologies and services.23
The biggest fear of those who opposed auctions was that auctions
would make small innovative entrepreneurs "part of the U.S.'s history,
not part of its future."2 4 Congress addressed this concern from the be-
ginning, stressing that the FCC was to come up with flexible payment
schedules and techniques to afford smaller entities the wherewithal to
compete in the auction against those with "deep pockets. 23 Others
were more concerned that money shouldn't be the overriding criterion
for granting licenses; the government should keep in mind social poli-
munications Act now requires the FCC to use penalties to try to prevent these abuses.
47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(B) (1995).
19. PCS Industry Speaks Out on Auctions, PCS NEws, Apr. 29, 1993, at 1.
20. "Insincere bidding, whether purely frivolous or strategic, distorts the price in-
formation generated by the auction process and reduces its efficiency." In re Implemen-
tation of § 309 0 ) of the Communications Act, Competitive Bidding, Second Report
and Order, 9 FCCR 2941, 147 (1994).
21. Barry E. Goodstadt, Narrowband Auctions Provided Lessons for Future PCS
Bidders, RCR, Nov. 21, 1994, at 23, 25.
22. Australia faced a parallel fiasco last year when it auctioned two separate li-
censes for direct-broadcast satellite television, only to discover that neither winner had
any intention of paying the full price. Each had made dozens of bids at sequentially
lower figures, with the plan of defaulting on all but the lowest figure needed to win.
Since the Government had made no provision for penalties for defaults on bids, this
strategy worked like a charm. Peter Passell, Economic Scene; Auctioning Off the Air-
waves Will be a Formidable Undertaking, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at D2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 152 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2748.
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cies, too. 6 In fact, Congress was not only concerned with raising
money for the treasury; Congress was also concerned that competitive
bidding would result in excluding small businesses, women, and minori-
ties from the telecommunications industry.17 Accordingly, Congress
mandated the FCC accommodate these "designated entities" (DEs) as
a kind of affirmative action. There was concern that merely selling the
spectrum to the highest bidder did not necessarily encourage technical
innovation. 8 The concern was that the emphasis on price would leave
the brilliant but poor entrepreneur out of the running. 9
While there was no indication traditional methods of disbursing
licenses really avoided these problems, proponents pointed to the money
auctions would make.30 Detractors from the auction mania pointed out
that auctions would not necessarily reap as much cash for the treasury
as proponents thought." The detractors suggested that licensees that
did not pay for their spectrum were more likely to be profitable, and
would therefore be eligible for a higher level of taxation. 32 Such a com-
pany was also likely to charge lower prices, thus generating more cus-
tomers and traffic - and tax revenues. A company which had to pay
for spectrum would pass the cost on to customers.3 3 Similarly, detrac-
tors were afraid that large auction payments as a start-up cost of doing
business would affect the profitability of companies. 3 ' Reduced profit-
ability might lead to a reduction in taxes paid by the company.3 5
26. Spectrum Auctions, MOBILE COMM., Nov. 7, 1991, at El; see also Russell
Gold, Fire Sale: Auctioning the Nation's Airwaves, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 27,
1993 at 46 (fearing that the government is so desperate for cash it will forget about
social responsibility).
27. H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 254-55 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2831. As noted infra, the special treatment of women and minorities
has been struck down by the recent Supreme Court ruling requiring such classifications
to meet the strictest scrutiny. (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097,
2117 (1995)) See Legal Ramifications infra regarding the FCC's reaction to Adarand.
28. PCS Industry Speaks Out on Auctions, PCS NEws, Apr. 29, 1993, at 1.
29. Id.
30. See, for example, NTIA STUDY at 115; Paul Farhi, Clinton Proposes Spec-
trum Auction; Benefits for Deficit, New Communications Technologies Seen, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at B12; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, § 6002, amending 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C) (1995).
31. Spectrum Auctions, MOBILE COMM., Nov. 7, 1991, at El.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. See also PCS Industry Speaks Out on Auctions, PCS NEws, Apr. 29,
1993, at 1.
35. PCS Industry Speaks Out on Auctions, PCS NEws, Apr. 29, 1993, at 1.
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2. Perceived Advantages
Overshadowing all the concerns were two major reasons in support
of auctions: economic efficiency and revenue for the government. Eco-
nomic efficiency would not only get services to the consumer faster, but
would encourage the introduction of spectrum-saving technologies
(which is highly important as the radiofrequency spectrum is finite).
Other related advantages included a quicker allocation process (as
there would be no lengthy evaluation of license applications) and the
transfer of the "monopoly (or operator) surplus" to the public via the
taxation and Treasury systems.3 6 The projections of revenue were se-
ductive, and projections increased as time went on (from five billion
dollars in 1992 to twelve billion dollars in 1995).37 The FCC addressed
the concerns raised in its proceedings, and developed procedures for
preventing and dealing with all of them (see THE AUCTIONs below).
3. The Final Step Towards Auctions
The FCC adopted a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) to
implement the Budget Act in late 1993.80 In its NPRM, the FCC ad-
vanced the view that auctions should award licenses to the parties that
value them the most. 9 Those parties are most likely to deploy new
technologies and services rapidly, promoting the development of compe-
tition, and thus fostering economic growth.40 Following the NPRM, the
FCC received several rounds of comments, and issued its First Report
and Order in February, 1994.1
III. THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE
A. History of the New Zealand Licensing Process
The history that led to the adoption of auction by New Zealand
36. Spectrum Auctions, MOBILE COMM., Nov. 7, 1991, at El.
37. In 1992, the Office of Management and Budget projected $4.5 billion in reve-
nues from auctioning the PCS bands. Auctions Loom Again, Study Calls Them Lucra-
tive Money Maker, SPECTRUM REPORT, May 13, 1992, at 1. In 1995, the industry
estimates were nearing $12 billion. Wireless Story of 1994: Broadband, Narrowband
PCS Auctions, ADVANCED WIRELESS COMM., Jan. 4, 1995, at 1.
38. NPRM supra note 14.
39. NPRM supra note 14, 1 34.
40. Second Report and Order supra note 4, 1 70.
41. In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act, Competi-
tive Bidding, First Report and Order in PP Docket No. 93-253, FCC 94-32, released
Feb. 4, 1994 (hereinafter "First Report and Order").
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was a bit different. Prior to 1987, the New Zealand government main-
tained a virtual monopoly in the provision and regulation of telecom-
munication services.' 2 This kind of national monopoly was repeated in
many areas, including the railroads, mines, utilities, ports, and hospi-
tals. 8 By the mid-1980s, the New Zealand economy was suffering from
persistent inflation and rising unemployment directly related to the per-
vasive government regulation of industry.4 ' The heavy-handed regula-
tion, along with cross-subsidies and protectionism, had led to misalloca-
tion of resources, thereby restricting private initiative and economic
growth, and creating great fiscal risk for the government.' 5 It was at
this time that New Zealand began an ambitious series of maneuvers to
privatize most of the services hitherto provided by the government.46
The management of the radio spectrum up until 1987 was handled
by the Post Office.' 7 Then in 1987, New Zealand passed the Telecom-
munications Aft, which opened up New Zealand's telecommunications
markets, with the goal of improving the efficiency with which new ser-
vices were provided to the public.' 8 Both structural and legislative
changes were implemented. Structurally, New Zealand ceded the pro-
vision of services to the newly-formed Telecom Corporation of New
Zealand, and transferred the spectrum management functions of the
old Post Office to the Ministry of Commerce (then called the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry). 9 Legislatively, New Zealand repealed
42. COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, RADIOCOMMUNICA-
TIONS ACT REVIEW DISCUSSION PAPER 5 (1994) (hereinafter NZ DISCUSSION PAPER).
43. NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, PRIVATISATION: THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERI-
ENCE 5 (1992)(hereinafter NZ PRIVITISATION).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 6.
47. Post Office Act of 1959. It is not unusual that the Post Office handled the
telecommunications in New Zealand; in almost every country except the United States,
it was the post office that also handled other forms of communication, such as tele-
graph and telecommunications. These ministries were commonly referred to as
"PTTs," for post, telegraph & telecommunications. These PTTs controlled the govern-
ment's monopoly on the provision of these services.
48. NZ DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 42, at 5; see also Telecommunications Act
of 1987.
49. NZ DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 42, at 6. Interestingly, in September,
1990, the New Zealand government sold Telecom to a consortium that included two
American telecommunications companies, Bell Atlantic and Ameritech. J. Gregory
Sidak, Telecommunications: The Big Picture; AEI's Gregory Sidak Explains the Ins
and Outs of Where the Industry Is Headed, How Other Countries Are Doing a Better
Job of Encouraging Competition, and What Reforms Will Really Work in the United
States, ROLL CALL, June 27, 1994, at 1.
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the old Post Office Act and enacted the Telecommunications Act 1987,
followed by the Telecommunications Amendment Act 1988. The Tele-
communications Amendment Act 1988 opened up telecommunications
services to full competition starting in 1989.10
B. The Decision to Auction
In 1989, New Zealand revolutionized the provision of its telecom-
munications services by passing the Radiocommunications Act, which
facilitated a market-based system for allocating spectrum. 51 This move
to a market-driven allocation was the recommendation of National Ec-
onomic Research Associates (NERA), which had been commissioned
in 1988 to report on the deregulation of New Zealand's telecommuni-
cations industry. 2 The NERA report had pinpointed several areas for
improvement. For example, the nontransferability of licenses meant
there were few incentives for existing users to economize on spectrum
use." Also, specifying which services could use which frequency bands
meant that some frequencies went unused, while other bands were con-
gested."' And importantly, the low fees charged gave incumbent users
little incentive to economize on spectrum use or to seek spectrum effi-
cient technologies."
The Radiocommunications Act of 1989 established two kinds of
"property rights" in the radio spectrum: management rights and li-
censes.5 ' Essentially, a "management right" in a frequency band gives
the manager the right to determine the use to which the band is to be
put, and to grant "licenses" to use those frequencies. 7 Any license may
be traded or mortgaged in a normal commercial manner without fur-
ther permission from the manager, but any such transaction must be
registered with the government. 5 For the most part, management
50. Telecommunications Amendment Act of 1988.
51. Radiocommunications Act of 1989. While the Act facilitated the adoption of
spectrum auctions, there is no specific section within the Act so authorizing the govern-
ment. New Zealand is currently considering amending the act to include such author-
ity. NZ DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 42, § 6.1.
52. NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, MANAGEMENT OF THE RADIO
FREQUENCY SPECTRUM IN NEW ZEALAND (1988) (hereinafter the NERA REPORT).
53. NERA REPORT, supra note 52, at 71,72.
54. NERA REPORT, supra note 52, at 72.
55. Id.
56. Radiocommunications Act of 1989, Part XI, §§ 98 -104 (Rights and Duties
of Managers and Rightholders).
57. NZ DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 42, § 4.3.2.
58. Specifically, with the Registrar of Radio Frequencies. COMMUNICATIONS DIVI-
SION, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, RADIO SPECTRUM TENDERS GENERAL INFORMATION 7
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rights are owned by the Crown, although at the time of privatization
some management rights were owned by incumbent license holders,
who would continue to hold management rights until the expiration of
their licenses. Property rights are considered created by the Crown
(specifically the Secretary of Commerce), 59 and are brought into com-
mercial circulation through public tenders, or auctions. 0 Property
rights last for a period of 20 years and on expiry automatically revert
to the Crown:6  there is no right of renewal."' In effect, there are three
tiers of management: the government at the top, the band managers at
the second tier, and the rightholders (or license holders) at the third
tier.6"
A major problem when dealing with radio frequencies is that the
use of one frequency may well interfere with anyone trying to use an-
other frequency. 64 New Zealand has dealt with the interference prob-
lem by regulating the equipment used,65 and by defining operating lim-
its such as output power and adjacent frequencies emissions.6 There
are internationally-defined uses for certain bands, administered by the
International Telecommunications Union, to which most countries (in-
cluding the U.S. and New Zealand) belong. So New Zealand is not
completely free to use the bands for whatever service it wants; there is
a need to be consistent with international band allocations, and to ac-
commodate the equipment available to provide services (often the
equipment is designed only to be used in a certain band).67 New Zea-
land has left the resolution of interference problems to the court sys-
tem. 68 New Zealand has left the control of the market to its Commerce
(1994) (hereinafter NZ GEN. INFO.). See also Radiocommunications Act § 26 (mort-
gages), § 42 (transfer of management rights).
59. Radiocommunications Act of 1989, Part II, §§ 9, 10.
60. NZ GEN. INFO., supra note 58, at 4, 7; see also Radiocommunications Act of
1989.
61. Radiocommunications Act of 1989, Part III, § 33.
62. NZ GEN. INFO., supra note 58, at 6.
63. NZ DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 42, § 4.3.1.
64. This is because of the technical problem of building equipment to receive the
frequencies; it is almost impossible to make equipment so sensitive that it picks up a
single frequency and completely blocks out the frequency next to it. Accordingly, regu-
lators assign non-contiguous frequencies to users in geographic closeness to avoid inter-
ference problems.
65. Radiocommunications Act of 1989, Part XIII.
66. Radiocommunications Act of 1989, Part XII.
67. NZ DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 42, § 2.4.4.
68. Radiocommunications Act of 1989, Part XIV. See also NZ DISCUSSION PA-
PER, supra note 42, at 11, and NERA REPORT app. V, supra note 52, p. 144.
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Act 1986, but this is currently being reviewed.69
New Zealand differs from the United States in how it allocates
spectrum. In the U.S., specific pieces of the spectrum are allocated to
rather specific uses and services. However, in New Zealand, instead of
delineating the specific services allowed to use a particular frequency
band, New Zealand has merely defined the technical parameters for
the band, so that users of different bands will not interfere with each
other."' While this may provide a de facto list of services that can use
the band, in many cases it allows a licensee substantially more flexibil-
ity in deciding what service and technology to provide.
1. Major Concerns
Like the United States, New Zealand had concerns about fraud
and anti-competitive behavior during the auction process."1 The two
countries also shared concerns that purely economic goals were not
smart government policy; the NERA Report was careful to point out
that "the highest private value use of spectrum might not necessarily
reveal the uses of highest social value. ' '7 2 In addition, industry players
were concerned about market dominance by non-New Zealand compa-
nies.73 The native New Zealand Maori people were concerned that the
auctions would violate treaty obligations under which the Maori had
been guaranteed access to the airwaves as a way to perpetuate and
protect their language and culture. 74 In fact, a recent challenge to the
69. NZ DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 42, Ch. 7. See also Commerce Act of 1986
§ 66(8) (balancing public interest against restrictions on "dominant" carriers).
70. NZ GEN. INFO., supra note 58, at 7. For example, New Zealand has defined
the strength of the signal put out (the "output power"), the modulation technique to be
used, and the specific bands the licensee may use. Id.
Such specifications may implicitly define a service that is best suited for the band
in question, but the licensee is not limited to that service. For example, television needs
a very broad piece of the frequency spectrum, but paging services need very little.
Thus, while a television broadcaster could not offer her service in a narrow band, the
paging company could not only use a narrow band, but even a band wide enough for
television. However, it is unlikely a paging company would do that, as the economics of
the situation would call for the most efficient use of the spectrum, which in this case
would be television broadcasting.
71. See generally NERA REPORT, supra note 52, at 126, 128 and 160, 161.
72. NERA REPORT, supra note 52, at 79 (emphasis added).
73. New Zealand Government Proposes Sale of Frequency Spectrum, FINTECH
7 - MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS, Nov. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS, News library,
FTMCOM File.
74. The Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975 obliged the New Zealand government to
"recognize and protect the Maori language."
19961
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awards of licenses (claiming that the government had not set aside
enough spectrum for the Maoris to use) held that the New Zealand
government had to allow the Maori council to comment on the
process .
The NERA Report highlighted concerns about how to deal with
the rights of existing users (i.e. operators currently using the spectrum
to be auctioned)76 and how to prevent technical interference among the
users. 7 7 Existing users were given the right to bid along with others, to
match the highest bid, and to continue using the spectrum for three
years (by renting it from the new licensee) even if the license were
awarded to another entity.
78
2. Perceived Advantages
Clearly, the arguments for economic efficiency and revenue-for-
the-government were persuasive in New Zealand as they were in the
United States. Furthermore, New Zealand accomplished another goal:
To avoid setting up a whole regulatory agency (like the U.S.'s FCC) to
handle spectrum issues. Instead, New Zealand's auctions were handled
by its Ministry of Commerce.
IV. THE AUCTIONS
A. In the U.S.
In its NPRM, the FCC indicated its intention to auction two ser-
vices: personal communications services (PCS - a technology similar to
cellular telephone services), and interactive video and data services
(IVDS - a service whereby a television viewer can interact with the TV
set to place orders, answer questions, etc.).7 9 After the NPRM, five
reports followed within the year, addressing many of the issues sur-
75. Att'y Gen. v. N.Z. Maori Council, 2 N.Z.L.R. 129 (1990), aff'd 1 A.C. 466
(P.C. 1994). The Court found that the New Zealand government had ignored the Ma-
ori tribunal's rights under the Waitangi Treaty to recommend actions affecting Maori
culture and language. (The Maori council's underlying objection was that no FM radio
stations in the major cities were being reserved for Maori ownership. Id.)
76. NERA REPORT, supra note 52, at 160-165.
77. NERA REPORT, supra note 52, at 84.
78. NERA REPORT, supra note 52, at 161, 165.
79. NPRM, supra note 14, 1 115, 142. It should be noted that the FCC was not
to use auctions for broadcasting. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2)(A) (specifying that auctions
should only be used for services "reasonably likely to involve the licensee receiving
compensation from subscribers," which broadcasting does not.)
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rounding auctions for those services.80 The first auctions took place in
late July, 1994.
There was considerable discussion about the mechanics of auction-
ing. The fair market value of the licenses was unknown, and would
depend on whether a company wanted a single license or several contig-
uous licenses. For example, if you were bidding for the rights to offer
PCS in the District of Columbia, you might be willing to pay more for
that license if you could also get the licenses for Maryland and Vir-
ginia.8 After a great deal of discussion and comment from economists
well-versed in game theory, the FCC decided to use "simultaneous
multiple-round bidding," where all the licenses of a particular type go
on sale together and bidders may, with some limitations, bid for any
collection of licenses until bidding stops."s In theory, this would help
the bidders arrive at the right prices, award the licenses to the compa-
nies that would use them efficiently, and produce the most revenue."8
Bidding was to continue until there were no new bids for any of
the licenses being auctioned at that time.8 The FCC reserved the right
to set the time interval that it would wait for a new bid, so that the
auctions might come to an end more quickly.85 The FCC set up activity
80. First Report and Order; In re Implementation of § 309(j) of the Communica-
tions Act, Competitive Bidding, Second Report and Order, 9 FCCR 2941 (1994)
(hereinafter Second Report and Order); In re Implementation of § 309(j) of the Com-
munications Act, Competitive Bidding, Third Report and Order, 59 FR 26741 (re-
leased May 10, 1994) (hereinafter Third Report and Order); In re Implementation of
§ 309(j) of the Communications Act, Competitive Bidding, Fourth Report and Order,
59 FR 24947 (released May 10, 1994) (hereinafter Fourth Report and Order); In re
Implementation of § 309(j) of the Communications Act, Competitive Bidding, Fifth
Report and Order, 59 FR 37566 (released July 15, 1994) (hereinafter Fifth Report
and Order).
81. First, common ownership of licenses would make it easier for customers to
roam from D.C. to Maryland or Virginia without changing service providers. Second,
the service provider could enjoy economies of scale by spreading out the costs of the
system over a larger number of customers. Third, the service provider would have fewer
interference problems at the border of the license area. These three things would trans-
late to lower costs for the service provider, and lower charges to the customer. (Second
Report and Order, supra note 4, 91.)
82. Bidding rounds would continue until no new bids were offered during a round.
Thus, as soon as one bidding round opened and closed with no new bids, the licenses
were awarded to the highest bidders from the previous round. (Second Report and
Order, supra note 4, 132.)
83. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, $ 106.,
84. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 132. Minimum bid increments are
now the greater of two cents per megahertz per pop, or 10 percent of the standing high
bid.
85. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 132.
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rules that divided each auction into three stages.8 6 The decision to ad-
vance from one stage to another was left to the FCC, which would base
the decision on the amount of activity and the percent change in the
bids.87
The rules were different for each service, with yet another set of
rules for spectrum set aside for DEs (the affirmative-action-like pro-
gram originally set up by the FCC)88 and for "pioneers" (technological
entrepreneurs who were rewarded for their ingenuity by being guaran-
teed a license). 89 For all the auctions, an interested bidder needed to
submit a short, one-page application along with an upfront payment; if
that bidder won, a second and more detailed application was required,
along with a 20 % downpayment on the winning price.9" The final lump
sum payment was due to the FCC within five days of the license being
awarded. 9'
The FCC implemented a series of regulatory safeguards against
trafficking and unjust enrichment as required by the Budget Act. The
safeguards applied mostly to DEs that received financial help (in the
form of bidding credits) or were eligible for the set-aside spectrum."
The FCC imposed a requirement that licensees notify the FCC of any
transfer of the license.93 In response to Congress' concerns about the
warehousing of spectrum, the FCC decided it's existing performance
requirements were enough. 94 There was also a requirement to build the
system within a certain period of time - the "build-out"
requirement. 95
Addressing the concerns about frivolous bids or unqualified bid-
ders, the FCC set up several kinds of penalties.96 For example, bidders
86. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 1 144.
87. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 1 140, n.109.
88. Fifth Report and Order, supra note 80, 2.
89. See generally ET Docket No. 93-266 (regarding Pioneer's Preferences in gen-
eral). See also Third Report and Order, Gen. Docket No. 90-314, 9 FCCR 1337
(1994) (granting PCS licenses to "pioneers").
90. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 1 192, 194.
91. Id.
92. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, Part V, 1 210-226.
93. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, T 214. The FCC intends to monitor
transfers to determine if any "unforeseen problems" relating to unjust enrichment de-
velop. Id.
94. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, T 219. For example, the FCC re-
quires some cellular-like service providers to utilize their existing allotment fully before
additional frequencies may be requested. Id.
95. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 1 240, 244.
96. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, § IV, "Procedural, Payment and
Penalty Issues." See also 134, 147, 197. Id.
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were penalized for falling below their minimum participation level.",
That minimum level was set by the bidder itself when it applied to
enter the auction: by applying to enter the auction, bidders made a
promise to the FCC to bid for a certain amount of spectrum; if they
reneged on that promise, they were penalized. 98 The minimum partici-
pation level was measured in terms of the amount of frequency the
bidder wanted (measured in megaHertz - MHz) and the size of the
population in the area covered by the license (measured in "pops").99
During the first stage of the auction, the bidders were required to be
active on licenses encompassing one-third of the MHz-pops for which
the bidder was eligible.' 0 The penalty for falling below that activity
level was a reduction in eligibility, i.e. a reduction in the amount of
spectrum for which the bidder could bid. 1 1 In the second stage, bidders
were required to be active on two-thirds of the MHz-pops for which
they were eligible.102 Again, the penalty for falling below that level was
a reduction in eligibility. 0 3 In the third and final stage, bidders were
required to be active on ALL the licenses for which they were eligible,
or lose one MHz-pop in eligibility for each MHz-pop below the mini-
mum required activity level.104
Another form of penalty was instituted if the high bid were with-
drawn before the end of the auction. The withdrawing bidder had to
pay the difference between the withdrawn bid and the amount of the
winning bid that the Commission eventually accepted.' 5 In the event a
winning bidder defaulted, the license would be reauctioned rather than
merely granted to the second-highest bidder. 106 The Commission felt
that "changing market and even technological developments since the
initial auction may change the amounts that bidders are willing to pay
for a license, especially if the intervening period is relatively long.' 0 7
The FCC feared that otherwise, the second-highest bidder might be
forced to take a license it no longer wanted. In the worst case, where a
97. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 144, 137.
98. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 151, 166, 172.
99. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 11 144, 137.
100. Id.
101. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 137. However, the Commission
allowed each bidder five waivers during the course of an auction for failure to meet the
minimum activity requirement. Id. at 145.
102. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 138.
103. Id.
104. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 139.
105. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 150, 151.
106. Fifth Report and Order, supra note 80, 79.
107. Fifth Report and Order, supra note 80, 78.
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winning bidder defaulted after the auction is over, not only is the de-
faulter required to reimburse the Commission for the difference be-
tween its high bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time the
license is offered by the Commission, but the defaulter was also as-
sessed a penalty of three percent of the subsequent winning bid.10 8 This
additional penalty was added to encourage those who wanted to back
out to do so while the auction was ongoing.
10 9
1. Auctions for Interactive Video and Data Services
The IVDS auctions were somewhat different from the PCS auc-
tions in that they used the open outcry method of bidding, rather than
simultaneous bidding. 110 Further, only businesses owned by women or
minorities were offered bidding credits."1 The auction took place in
June, 1994, and the FCC awarded 594 licenses and garnered
$3,270,000.112 The FCC addressed Congress's concerns about unjust
enrichment by controlling trafficking in licenses: any license-holder in-
terested in transferring their licenses within the first five years of get-
ting the license must submit an application to the FCC to be scruti-
nized closely for evidence of unjust enrichment. 113
Congress's concerns about collusion proved to be well-founded: an
FCC investigation immediately after the auction turned up evidence
that a bidder which defaulted on its required downpayment had col-
luded with other bidders to get them to renege on the downpayments
due to the FCC.1 14 The FCC penalized the company in question by
dismissing its application and assessing a $390,000 fine."'
108. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 197.
109. Id.
110. Fourth Report and Order, supra note 80, % 2.
111. Fourth Report and Order, supra note 80, 39.
112. Erratum to Aug. 2, 1994 Pub. Notice Announcing High Bidders for 594
Interactive Video and Data Service (IVDS) Licenses, 1994 FCC LEXIS 3907, ERRA-
TUM (44265), Aug. 9, 1994.
113. Fourth Report and Order, supra note 80, 30.
114. Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 10 FCCR 4277, 1 (1995). The
FCC found evidence that the company in question, Commercial Realty St. Pete, Inc.,
had made a phone call to another bidder and sent faxes to all the other winners in the
IVDS auction to encourage them to delay sending in the required downpayment (which
would result in defaults). Id. 1 14, 15.
115. Id. 1, 2. The default penalty was based on:
a) $20,000 ($10,000 for two violations of the anti-collusion rules (Id. 20)); plus
b) $170,000 ($10,000 for each market in which the company improperly claimed a
discount for being a woman-owned business (17 markets) (Id. 24)); plus
c) $200,000 ($10,000 for each market in which the company won a license but failed to
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2. Auctions for Personal Communications Services
The PCS auctions were divided into two groups: narrowband PCS
and broadband PCS, based upon different allocations of spectrum and
slightly different technology."0 Under the narrowband PCS regime,
some applicants were granted "pioneers' preference" licenses off the
top (there was no auction),' 1 7 and designated entities were given bid-
ding credits." 8 The United States was divided into four different ser-
vice areas for narrowband PCS: there were 492 basic trading areas
(BTAs), 51 major trading areas (MTAs), five regional areas (made up
of MTAs) which together comprise the nation, and a nationwide ser-
vice area. Within those areas, there were a total of 3,554 licenses to be
won: 2,952 BTA licenses, 561 MTA licenses, 30 regional licenses, and
11 nationwide licenses." 9 When no DEs won licenses in the national
narrowband PCS auctions, the rules were revamped to help attract des-
ignated entities to the regional auction. The new rules gave those bid-
ders larger credits than in the nationwide auction. 2 ' Remote bidding
and disclosure of bidders' identities during the auction were also among
the new procedures used during the regional auction.' 2 ' The auctions
for the nationwide narrowband PCS licenses lasted 105 rounds. 2
2
The broadband PCS licenses were to "constitute the largest auc-
tion of public assets in American history."' 23 The Commission divided
the spectrum into six "blocks" (labelled A through E) comprising
submit the required downpayment (20 markets) (Id. 7 22)).
In addition, the company will be liable for penalties of not less than $1,237,500. This is
based on a calculation of the difference between the amount of the defaulted bid
($41,250,000) and the amount the government receives when the license is reauctioned,
plus an additional 3 per cent of the defaulted bid amount or the subsequent winning
bid amount, whichever is less. In any event, even if the subsequent winning bids are
higher than the original company's defaulted bids, the minimum default penalty will be
3 per cent of the company's defaulted bids, which is $1,237,500. (Id. n.17).
116. See generally Third Report and Order (regarding narrowband PCS) and
Fifth Report and Order (regarding broadband PCS).
117. In the Matter of Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Establish New Per-
sonal Comm. Serv's, Third Report and Order, 9 FCCR 1337, 7 1-2 (1993).
118. Second Report and Order, supra note 4, 7 3.
119. Third Report and Order, supra note 80, 7 10.
120. Wireless Story of 1994: Broadband, Narrowband PCS Auctions, ADVANCED
WIRELESS COMM., Jan. 4, 1995, at 1.
121. Id.
122. Mark Bykowsky, The FCC's 'Fat Lady' is Singing About Successful PCS
Auctions, RCR, Nov. 21, 1994, at 28. The local narrowband PCS auctions had not
occurred as of this writing.
123. Fifth Report and Order, supra note 80, V 1.
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2,074 licenses.2 Blocks A, B, and C comprised licenses for bigger geo-
graphic areas, and blocks D, E, and F comprised licenses for smaller
geographic areas. 12 5 Additionally, blocks C and F (one large and one
small block) were set aside'to be bid upon only by DEs.12' The Com-
mission granted pioneer's preference to three broadband PCS
applicants. 127
3. Licenses Granted Without Auctions: Pioneer's Preference
Some time ago, the FCC decided that it was appropriate to reward
technological ingenuity by guaranteeing that the inventor/entrepreneur
of a new service would get a license, in addition to any other licenses
that might be awarded. 2 8 When Congress amended the 1934 Commu-
nications Act in 1993, it allowed the FCC leeway to award some li-
censes without going through competitive bidding. Exempted from auc-
tioning were licenses awarded "to those persons who make significant
contributions to the development of a new telecommunications service
or technology," otherwise known as "pioneer's preference" licenses.129
Later, pioneers were required to pay roughly 85 cents on the dollar for
their licenses.' 3 0
B. In New Zealand
While the U.S. Congress and the FCC decided for the public
which services would be available through auctions, the New Zealand
government left that choice up to the public. Any member of the public
124. Fifth Report and Order, supra note 80, 6. The A, B, and C blocks were
bigger (30 MHz each), and the D, E, and F blocks were smaller (10 MHz each). Id.
125. Id. Further complicating things, the Commission also defined two kinds of
service areas within each block: basic trading areas (BTAs) and major trading areas
(MTAs). There were 493 BTAs and 51 MTAs established for broadband PCS. Id.
126. Fifth Report and Order, supra note 80, at 7, 12-13.
127. Fifth Report and Order, supra note 80, at n.4. Pioneers got licenses in Los
Angeles, Washington/Baltimore, and New York City. Id.
128. The pioneer's preference rules currently award innovation by providing a
means by which an applicant that demonstrates having developed a new communica-
tions service or technology may obtain a license without being subject to mutually ex-
clusive applications. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.402. However, the FCC is currently reviewing
its pioneer's preference rules in light of the new competitive bidding authority. See
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in ET Docket No. 93-253, 8 FCCR 7692 (1993).
129. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)(G) (1995).
130. Included in legislation implementing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Post Bails Out of PCS, Ends Pioneer's Preference Nightmare by Selling APC
Stake to Spring/Cable Company Venture, PCS News, Jan. 19, 1995, available in
LEXIS, FedCom Library, ComPub File.
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could issue an "expression of interest" for the tendering of any piece of
the radio spectrum currently managed by the Crown. "1 This expression
of interest did not guarantee the issuer a license, but merely got the
process rolling.1 3 2 When the Ministry of Commerce decided to tender
some spectrum, it issued a "Tender Document" containing the condi-
tions of sale and the technical description of the lots being offered. "
To date, tenders have been made for UHF television, cellular radio,
microwave and AM/FM broadcast service.134 Interested bidders were
invited into a competitive "bid tender," with equal information availa-
ble to all bidders at each stage. A short list of bidders eligible to make
a final bid for the spectrum was made on the basis of the initial bids. "
Spectrum was auctioned only if there were more than one expression of
interest: if there were only one, the spectrum was allocated for free.
The first auctions were for 70 licenses in the UHF band, primarily for
television broadcasting.138
Anyone applying for a tendered lot was required to submit a bid
form containing, among other things, certifications that the new service
would not interfere either with already registered services, or with es-
sential services such as radio navigation or services protecting life and
property.13 7 New Zealand's auctions followed the sealed bid, "second-
price" method, in which the high bidder wins the auction but pays the
second-highest bid. This reputable method reassures bidders for new
and untested goods that they will not end up paying a wildly inflated
price through miscalculation.1" Furthermore, if there were an incum-
bent licensee in the frequency block being tendered, the incumbent en-
joyed a "preemptive right," through which the incumbent had the right
to win the block by matching the highest bid. " '
A successful tender did not guarantee licensing; the tenderer still
131. NZ GEN. INFO., supra note 58, at 8.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 9.
134. Jonathan Marshall, Stakes High in Spectrum Auction - Government Ends
Giveaway of Broadcast Frequencies, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 1994, at BI.
135. NZ PRIVATIZATION, supra note 43, at 8.
136. NTIA STUDY, supra note 6, at 94.
137. Radiocommunications Act of 1989, Part III, § 25(2).
138. Marshall, supra note 134.
139. NZ GEN. INFO., supra note 58, at 10. Note that incumbent licensees were
not in danger of having their frequencies sold out from under them; currently-held
blocks were only tendered at the request of the licensee, usually to enable an increase
in power or to change the location of a transmitter. Id. Only in this situation did the
"preemptive right" pertain. Id.
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had to get approval under the Commerce Act 1986.140 Once cleared by
the Ministry of Commerce, a licensee had 10 days in which to pay the
tendered amount in full (less the deposit paid when applying to partici-
pate in the tender/auction). 141 The final step was to register the license
with the "Register of Radio Frequencies," an independent office within
the Ministry of Commerce." 2 There is also a fee payable annually for
all registered licenses, which depends on the service offered and the
maximum power permitted by the license.
148
V. THE AFTERMATH
A. Results of the Auctions
The results in the United States were heady: bidders were willing
to pay money far in excess of that anticipated by either the government
or industry observers." Four auctions have been held as of this writ-
ing: one for nationwide narrowband PCS, one for regional narrowband
PCS, one for IVDS, and one for blocks A and B of broadband PCS.
(The controversial auction of block C - set aside for DEs - was un-
derway as of this writing.) 145 There were 11 nationwide narrowband
licenses granted, raising over six million dollars." 6 Of the 30 regional
narrowband PCS licenses, one went to a pioneer, 11 were won by desig-
nated entities, and nearly 500 million dollars were raised. 1 7
The results in New Zealand were less successful financially, but
also far less controversial legally. New Zealand's "second price" auc-
tion strategy caused the government to lose hundreds of thousands of
dollars in a handful of cases where the second-highest bids were frivo-
140. NZ GEN. INFO., supra note 58, at 12. This is where Telecom New Zealand
ran into trouble trying to get a license to provide cellular radio. Id. Despite having won
the tender, the Court of Appeals found Telecom to have violated the market-dominance
restrictions in the Commerce Act. Telecom Corp. of N.Z. Ltd. v. Commerce Comm'n,
3 N.Z.L.R. 429 (C.A. 1992).
141. NZ GEN. INFO., supra note 58, at 12.
142. Radiocommunications Act of 1989, Part I, §§ 4-6.
143. NZ GEN. INFO., supra note 58, at 15, referring to fee schedules in the Radio-
communications Regulations, as authorized by the Radiocommunications Act 1989,
Part XV, § 135.
144. Bykowsky, supra note 122.
145. More Than 370 Entities Apply for C-Block Auction; Applications Show
Tangled Web of Partnerships, PCS WEEK, Dec. 6, 1995.
146. Narrowband PCS Nationwide Auction Winners, Report No. PCS-NB-94-1,
Aug. 17, 1994. One of the 11 licenses was not auctioned, as it was awarded to a pio-
neer. Third Report and Order 10.
147. FCC Announces Results of PCS Regional Narrowband License Auction,
1994 FCC Lexis 5617, Nov. 8, 1994.
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lously low - as little as a few dollars.148 This distortion in prices for
similar property rights moved New Zealand to switch to a simple high-
est-bidder system. 149 Evidence mounted that the precise sequencing of
privatizations was not critical. 5 ' Concerns about foreign ownership en-
ded up enhancing the competitive nature of the bidding and the trans-
parency of pricing.' 5 '
In New Zealand, actual revenues ended up around 16 per cent of
the pre-auction estimates.' 5 ' The auctions raised about NZ$ 36 billion.
But perhaps more important than the absolute dollars they garnered,
the New Zealand auctions proved the merit of auctions as a simple,
cheap and fair way to open up the spectrum to new providers and ser-
vices.' 53 On the other hand, the auctions took New Zealand more than
two years to complete, which belies the arguments favoring auctioning
as a faster way to get technology to the public.
In the U.S., the nationwide, narrowband PCS auctions raised $617
million.' 5 ' The 30 regional narrowband PCS licenses brought in $395
million ($488 million, excluding discounts applied on behalf of desig-
nated entities).1s5 Of interest is that while only ten licenses were enti-
tled to bidding credits for DEs, there were actually 11 licenses bought
by minority or female-owned firms. 156 Even with the bidding credits,
though, women and minority applicants paid about the same or more
than others for identical licenses. 6 7 While the broadband PCS auctions
were still going on as of this writing, by the end of 1995 the auctions
148. Rob Norton, Winning the Game of Business, TIME, Feb. 6, 1995, at 36. A
company that had bid 100,000 New Zealand dollars for a license walked away with it
for $6.
149. NZ DiscUssIoN PAPER, supra note 42, at 80.
150. Stephen Franks, Rigorous Privatization: The New Zealand Experience, 28
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF WORLD BUSINESS 84, 94 (1993).
151. Id.
152. Russell Gold, Auctioning the Nation's Airwaves, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Dec.
27, 1994, at 46.
153. Jonathan Marshall, Stakes High in Spectrum Auction: Government Ends
Giveaway of Broadcast Frequencies, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 1994, at B1.
154. It was interesting to note that the ten licenses went to only 6 different enti-
ties: Air Touch Communications, BellSouth Corp., McCaw, Mobile Telecommunica-
tion Technologies Corp., Paging Network Inc. and PageMart Inc. Jeffrey Silva, Re-
gional Auctions Give Licenses to the Established and the New, RCR, Nov. 21, 1994,
at 20.
155. Id.
156. Id. All ten of the licenses for which the 40 percent bidding credit was availa-
ble in the regional PCS auction went to such designated entities. FCC Announces Re-
sults of PCS Regional Narrowband License Auction, NEWS RELEASE, Nov. 8, 1994.
157. Id.
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had already raised over $7 billion, making it the "largest auction of
government assets in history." 158 The IVDS auctions that took place in




In amending the 1934 Communications Act, Congress made it
clear that making money for the government was not the only reason to
auction licenses, and that a major goal for the FCC was to "ensure that
small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by
members of minority groups and women are given the opportunity to
participate in the provision of spectrum-based services." 160 Industry ob-
servers were particularly worried that entities bidding under DE prefer-
ences might not really be DEs; the entity was more likely to be a part-
nership between a true DE and a "deep pocket," controlling the DE
through its purse strings. 61 The FCC spent a great deal of effort to
define exactly what entities were entitled to this preferential treatment,
and on how to accord preferential treatment without leaving loopholes
susceptible to abuse. 6 2
158. Auction for Broadband Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licenses,
1995 FCC Lexis 1703, Mar. 13, 1995. See also Broadband PCS Auction Still Going
Strong; Bids Pass $3B Mark, ADVANCED WIRELESS COMM., Jan. 18, 1995, at 1. As of
the end of January, 1996, the net high bids for the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) broadband Personal Communication Services (PCS) auction for the "C
Block" totalled $ 2,184,111,438 as the ninth round of bidding closed. FED. COMM.
COMM'N, Daily Digest, Jan. 22, 1996.
159. Patrice Apodaca and Jube Shiver, Jr., Southland Firm Spotlights FCC Auc-
tion Woes; Telecom: Failure of Sun Valley Company and Others to Ante Up Money
for Interactive TV Licenses Casts Cloud on Bidding Process, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1994, at DI.
160. 47 U.S.C. §§ 3090)(7), 309(j)(4)(D) (1995).
161. Jeffrey Silva, Designated Entities Taking Part in Auctions Gets Mixed Re-
views, RCR, Nov. 21, 1994, at 26.
162. For example, instead of having to pay the final payment in a lump sum, some
DEs (specifically small businesses) were allowed to pay in installments. Second Report
and Order, supra note 4, 1 233, 234. Another measure adopted by the FCC was to
give bidding credits to DEs that allowed eligible applicants to receive a discount on
their winning bid. Id. 242. In other auctions, some spectrum was actually set aside to
be bid on only by DEs. Id. 1 247. A reduction in the upfront payment was deemed
appropriate to encourage participation by eligible DEs. Id. 248. To prevent unjust
enrichment of DEs bidding on the spectrum set aside just for them, the Commission
imposed a recapture provision designed to recoup for the government a portion of the
value of the benefit received by the DE in the bidding. Such a recapture provision
would require that licensees seeking to transfer their licenses for profit must remit to
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However, the best-laid plans of Congress and the FCC were
thrown into disarray in June, 1994, when the Supreme Court decided
that any government plan based explicitly on race must be analyzed
under strict scrutiny. 18 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the
Court held that such classifications are only constitutional if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental inter-
ests. 164 This affected the broadband PCS auction because the FCC had
designated one block of licenses to be auctioned only to minorities,
women and small businesses. 66 After Adarand, the FCC eliminated
the preferences being offered to minorities and women, leaving only
small businesses qualified for special bidding and payment plans. 166
The FCC was immediately attacked by groups on all sides complaining
about the latest rules. A suit was filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit against the FCC asking the Court to impose an in-
junction on the auctions.16 In October the Court rejected the request,
the government a penalty equal to a portion of the total value of the benefit conferred
by the government. The penalty was to be reduced as time passed, and would be zero
after five years. Id. 260, 261, 262. If a license were transferred to another DE, no
recapture penalty would be assessed. Id. 262. To prevent unjust enrichment of DEs
entitled to pay in installments, the FCC required payment of the full amount of the
remaining principle balance should the DE transfer the license. Id. 263. To prevent
unjust enrichment of DEs entitled to bidding credits, the FCC required the DE to
repay the credit before transferring the license. Id. 264.
163. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
164. Id.
165. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(C) (Law. Co-op. 1995).
166. See generally In the Matter of Implementation of Section 3090) of the
Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, Sixth Report and Order, FCC 95-301
(1995) (hereinafter Sixth Report and Order). Such preferences had been held to be
constitutional in an earlier case, Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Metro Broadcasting held that benign race-conscious
measures approved by Congress did not violate the equal protection clause if they
served important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and were sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives. Metro Broadcasting went on to
hold that the congressionally-mandated, narrowly-tailored, race-conscious programs
designed to promote diversity of media ownership were subject only to intermediate
scrutiny, and further, the administrative agency which faithfully implements a congres-
sional mandate is due the same degree of deference as that afforded to Congress. (Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Minority Media and Telecommunications Council, et al. in Sup-
port of Respondents at 5, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir.
1994) (No. 93-1841) (referring to Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990))). However after Adarand, Metro Broadcasting is effectively overturned.
167. The ten companies were consolidated into one suit, Omnipoint Corp. v. Fed-
eral Communications Commission, No. 95-1374 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The companies in-
volved were: Central Alabama Partnership L.P.; Cook Inlet Region Inc.; Go Communi-
cations Corp.; Mobile Tri-States L.P.; National Association for the Advancement of
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and the FCC was allowed to proceed with the C block auction.16 8
New Zealand is currently undergoing a review of the 1989 Radi-
ocommunications Act, with the intention of developing draft legislation
for introduction into Parliament as an amending bill.16 9 Like New Zea-
land, the FCC continues to modify the rules for future auctions as it
learns lessons from auctions just held. Under consideration already are
possible changes to the rules for both the entrepreneur's blocks and the
designated entities' set-asides.17 0
In the U.S., the auctions may raise the issue of property rights in
spectrum once again. Long ago, the U.S. decided not to recognize spec-
trum property rights in licensees.1 7 ' Both legislative and case law histo-
ries suggest that spectrum is not something to be "owned" by licen-
sees. 17 2 However, for all practical purposes, licensees have quasi-
property rights since the rights are exclusive in terms of authorization
to use specific frequencies and protection from harmful interference.
Licensees also may receive income from the use of the license, and have
the de facto right to transfer the license as part of a sale of assets, even
though FCC approval is required.17 3 Furthermore, there has developed
over the years a body of law surrounding the licensee's reasonable ex-
pectation of renewal of its license. With licenses now being sold for
market value, the question is raised whether the new license procedure
somehow broadens the scope, or alters the quality, of the property
rights held by the licensee. The NTIA study concluded that there need
not be any change in the quality or scope of the rights conferred,""
although case law may develop differently.
VI. CONCLUSION
New Zealand's overall experience with privatization was nearly
"textbook," leaving only the concern that the gains may not be sustain-
Colored People; National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters; New Wave LLC;
Omnipoint Corp.; Qtel Wireless Inc.; and Radiofone Inc. Id. See also Jeffrey Silva,
Hundt: FCC Auction is Stymied by Court, RCR, Sep. 4, 1995, at 1,6.
168. Omnipoint Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, order vacating
stay (No. 95-1374) (Sep. 28, 1995).
169. NZ DiscussiON PAPER, supra note 42, at 1.
170. Additional Comment Sought on the Commission's Narrowband PCS Entre-
preneur's Block Proposals, PUBLIC NOTICE DA 94-1560, Oct. 19, 1994.
171. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304 (1994).
172. NTIA STUDY, supra note 6, at 113.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 113, 114.
SPECTRUM AUCTIONS
able.17 5 Isolation from much of the world enabled New Zealand to
strike out into new frontiers in a way that the United States could not.
In fact, while the FCC learned much from New Zealand about the
mechanics of auctions, it was unable to avoid the peculiarly American
minefield of affirmative action. It appears likely that the FCC will con-
tinue to use auctions for many services,176 but the designated entity
program is likely to be revised down to nothing, along with all other
Congressional affirmative action plans.
Current authority under the Communications Act to award li-
censes by auction terminates in 1998. 7  The FCC is required to evalu-
ate the auction method and report to Congress by 1997 so that Con-
gress can consider further statutory changes to improve the competitive
bidding process.17 8
There are those who think the FCC should be abolished entirely;
spectrum could be auctioned off by the Department of the Interior
(which already auctions off other government-owned commodities); the
Department of Justice could police trusts; the states could regulate
rights-of-way to power lines, etc.; a licensee could take trespassers to
court, and let competition and the market take care of the rest. 179
However, the less-than-rosy results in New Zealand and the enormous
bureaucracy entrenched in the current system make this appealing but
simplistic scenario unlikely.
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